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Why Logic, Experience, and Precedent
Compel the Demise of Mandatory
Sentencing Statutes
William Wray Jr.∗
INTRODUCTION

My comment begins with an uncontroversial maxim: “Let the
punishment fit the crime.” 1 From that modest beginning it
alternately crawls, leaps, and shuffles towards its brassy
conclusion: in order that the punishments better fit the crime,
sentencing discretion should be vested in judges, and mandatory
sentencing statutes should be abolished. Mandatory sentencing
statutes needlessly inject complex heuristics into a decision that
may be made equally as well—if not better—from the judge’s
bench.
Though loathe to suggest that the strength of an argument
depends on the author’s perspective, I note that I would describe
neither myself nor this argument as “pro-Defendant” or “proProsecution.” If mandatory sentencing statutes are abolished, the
net effect may be to decrease the aggregate length of criminal
sentences. Or the net effect might be an increase in the aggregate
length of criminal sentences. My argument is merely that if
∗ Lord of Sealand, candidate for Juris Doctor. I’d like to thank Nick Nybo and
the other editors of this article, and my family. To the extent that this shabby
note can support a dedication, it is dedicated to Thanh Van Tran and Robert
O. Wray Sr., two men who emerged from war-torn Vietnam to share enduring
principles for a happy and fulfilling life.
1.
This maxim was popularized by W.S. Gilbert in his 1885 opera the
“Mikado.” W.S. GILBERT & A. SULLIVAN, MY OBJECT ALL SUBLIME, IN A
TREASURY OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 284 (Simon & Schuster eds. 1941)
[hereinafter GILBERT, MY OBJECT ALL SUBLIME].
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mandatory sentencing statutes are abolished, sentences will more
precisely reflect the culpability of the defendant. If this is not an
outright improvement for both groups, it is at least a Pareto
improvement.
Throughout this comment, I will use the term “rounding
error” to describe a flaw that I believe is common in mandatory
sentencing statutes. In brief, if Alice, Bobby, and Carol are
convicted of the same crime and receive the same sentence
although they deserve different sentences based on facts not
accounted for in the sentencing statute, then the statute has
committed a “rounding error.” Bobby is the type of criminal
contemplated by the drafters of the mandatory sentencing statute
and receives the mandatory, and appropriate, sentence of eight
years. Alice’s crime, however, involved aggravating factors not
accounted for in the statute and deserved a sentence of ten years
instead of the eight she ultimate receives. Carol’s crime involved
mitigating factors not accounted for in the statute, and deserved a
sentence of seven years. The “rounding error” in Alice’s case is two
years and in Carol’s case, one year. Rather than calculate the
sentence based on Alice, Bob, and Carol’s individual culpability,
the statute has “rounded” three factually different crimes into one
crime.
Part I lists a series of rounding errors which illustrate how
mandatory sentencing statutes are flawed. Part II discusses the
federal Armed Career Criminal Act as an example which neatly
illustrates almost all of the flaws described in Part I. Part III slips
the surly bonds of empiricism and offers a rationalist argument
that vesting sentencing discretion in judges (or juries) better
serves each of the four Supreme Court-approved goals justifying
penal sanctions (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation). Part IV summarizes Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the individualization of sentencing determinations, and
suggests that the Court is nudging the states towards adopting
individualized sentencing determinations. Though the Supreme
Court has stated that in most cases “individualizing sentencing
determinations . . . [is] simply enlightened policy rather than a
constitutional imperative,” 2 a string of recent cases suggest that it
may have had its fingers crossed. And since the Court has
2.

Woodson v. N. Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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departed from an originalist reading of the Eighth Amendment,3
the would-be limiting principle to these cases is society’s limitless
“evolving standards of decency.” 4 Part V addresses some of the
counter-arguments to the thesis that judges are better sentencers
than statutes, and suggests that the experience of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and empirical studies indicate that these
objections are unfounded.
PART I. FLAWS OF MANDATORY SENTENCING STATUTES

Mandatory sentencing statutes exhibit some of the following
flaws:
(1) They are underinclusive. Though legislators intended to
sanction violent criminals, in their attempts to draft the statute so
as not to be overinclusive, violent criminals in fact escape the
sanction. 5
(2) They are overinclusive. Though the drafters may have
intended to sanction only violent criminals, non-violent criminals
are in fact sanctioned. 6
(3) They omit relevant mitigating and aggravating factors.
Though mandatory sentencing statutes may include mitigating
and aggravating factors, (youth, criminal record, etc.), sometimes
relevant factors are omitted 7 or calculated too rigidly.
(4) They are cumbersome to apply.8
(5) They are wasteful. The “cumbrous and expensive”9
machinery of the state is set in motion to determine whether a
given defendant is guilty. In the process, details relevant to the
culpability of the defendant are learned by the judge and the jury.
Yet mandatory sentencing schemes, which by necessity lump
3. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2040 (2010).
4. Id. at 2024.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See, e.g., Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103 (Ark. 2011) (addressing
“the mandatory sentencing of children fourteen years of age and younger to
life without the possibility of parole.”), rev’d sub nom. Miller v. Alabama, 132
S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Notably, in Jackson v. Norris, the fact that the criminal
was 14-years-old was irrelevant to his sentence as the Arkansas Supreme
Court refused “to extend the Court’s bans to homicide cases involving a
juvenile where the death penalty is not an issue.” Id. at 106.
8. See infra Part II.
9. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881).
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disparate defendants into broader categories, “waste” these
valuable facts by ignoring them.
(6) They are either useless or unjust, depending on the range
of sentences provided. Much like price floors and price ceilings, if
the mandatory sentencing scheme sets a range which is broad
enough to allow a sentencing judge to consider every possible
mitigating or aggravating factor, whether or not included in the
statute, then they do not constrain judges. If the statute sets a
narrower range such that a judge may not hand down different
sentences to defendants who, though categorized identically,
exhibit different levels of culpability, then they are unjust.
PART II. THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT.

Though examples of mandatory sentencing statutes abound, I
have chosen the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) as
illustrative of several issues with mandatory sentencing schemes.
The portion of the Armed Career Criminal Act discussed
herein mandates a minimum sentence of imprisonment of fifteen
years for “armed career criminals,” 10 or, more precisely, those who
have violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (which criminalizes the
possession of firearms by felons) 11 and have a criminal record
consisting of three or more violent felonies.
So far, this sounds dandy. The title “Armed Career Criminal
Act” and its statutory text evoke a common-sense story: a criminal
with a prior violent felony record is caught with a gun; since he is
an armed career criminal, he should receive a mandatory boost to
his sentence relative to non-armed and/or non-career criminals.
(Of course, even if the ACCA were abolished, a defendant’s
criminal history would bear directly on the length of the
sentence.) 12
A nit-picker might harvest his first nit from the term “armed
career criminal.” Though there is a sort of surface logic in the
term—one has to be both armed and a career criminal—the label
obscures the fact that the two adjectives may have been earned
disjunctively. An eighteen-year old boy—let’s call him Sue—may
10. THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FED. SENTENCING L. & PRAC. § 4B1.4
(2012 ed.) [hereinafter FED. SENTENCING L. & PRAC.].
11. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (hence “career criminals”).
12.
FED. SENTENCING L. & PRAC., supra note 10, at §5A (charting the
effect of a defendant’s criminal history on a putative federal sentence).
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amass before his twenty-second birthday a record of three
felonious assault and battery convictions (Bar fights. Sue was
inexplicably touchy.). He is now and always will be a “career
criminal” according to 924(e)(1) of the ACCA. 13 If, after a saintly
forty years, Sue buys a hunting rifle in Tennessee and is caught as
he drives into Arkansas, he is now an “armed career criminal.”
But Sue was not armed for the qualifying felonies; Sue’s career
was not necessarily criminal.
The ACCA’s flaws are not simply semantic; it exhibits many
of the wasteful, unjust mechanisms that taint mandatory
sentencing schemes. The seat of these defects is its definition of a
violent felony, which itself informs who is an armed career
criminal. An armed career criminal is “a person who . . . has three
previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of
this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 14 A violent
felony is a crime that
[1] has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against . . . another,
[2] . . . is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or] involves use of
explosives . . . or [3] otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another. 15
Condition 1 is called the “Force Clause.” Condition 2 has no
pithy name – I will call it the “Enumerated Felonies Clause.”
Condition 3 is called the “Residual Clause.”
A. The Force Clause: Violently Underinclusive
Force Clause analysis of a given crime presents to judges an
abstract question, “Is battery violent?”, rather than “Was the
battery committed by John Smith on December 1st violent?” 16 As
a result, though 99% of battery convictions may be based on
violent behavior, battery may not qualify as a violent felony under
the Force Clause. Judges are barred from utilizing police reports,
complaint applications, etc. to flesh out details germane to
violence vel non because they are “generally limited to examining
13.
14.
15.
16.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
Id.
Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1273 (2010).
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the statutory definition, charging document, written plea
agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual
finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.”17
Judges must assume a categorical approach to a crime: if there is
but one way that the given crime may be committed non-violently,
then the entire crime is ‘not violent’ under the Force Clause.18
Thus is the Force Clause underinclusive. In Johnson v. United
States, the Supreme Court was obliged to determine whether
Florida battery constituted a violent felony under the Force
Clause of the ACCA 19 (When analyzing what the elements of a
given crime are, federal courts are to refer to state law
constructions of the crime.) 20
In Florida, one may be convicted of battery whenever “the
element of actually and intentionally touching [is satisfied],” and
“any intentional physical contact, no matter how slight,” satisfies
the requirement. 21 By contrast, the ACCA definition of physical
force—a matter of federal law 22—is “violent force-that is, force
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”23
Since, in Florida, “[t]he most nominal contact, such as a ta[p] . . .
on the shoulder without consent, establishes a violation,” the
crime of battery in Florida is not a violent felony under the Force
Clause. 24
It may well be that 99% of batteries committed in Florida
involve the use of “violent force.” But because judges—in the
absence of documents which detail a specific instance of a crime—
are obliged to deem a crime non-violent because there is
theoretically a way to commit the crime without violent force, then
individuals who have committed violent felonies escape the
ACCA’s sentencing enhancement.
B. The Enumerated Felonies
The first clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) simply lists some
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
See, e.g., Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1266.
Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id. at 1269-70 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1270 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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per se violent felonies, “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or a crime
that] involves use of explosives.” This is both under and
overinclusive. Because all of the enumerated crimes could be
committed non-violently, particularly extortion, this clause is
overinclusive. In Iowa, one may be convicted of extortion if one so
little as “[t]hreatens to expose any person to hatred, contempt, or
ridicule.” 25 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit recently confirmed
that a conviction of extortion counts as a violent felony for the
purpose of the sentencing guidelines. 26
The underinclusiveness of the enumerated felonies clause
stems from the Supreme Court’s holding in Taylor v. United
States.27 The Court analyzed the legislative history of ACCA and
determined that when the enumerated felonies were listed,
Congress did not contemplate that any state conviction which
happened to be labeled burglary is necessarily a violent offense;
instead, Congress intended for the “modern ‘generic’ view” of the
crime to be counted as a violent felony. 28 Thus, in order for a state
conviction for one of the enumerated crimes to count as a violent
felony, it must both 1) require the jury to find all of the elements
of the crime of “generic” burglary, and 2) not criminalize a wider,
less culpable range of conduct than that which the generic offense
entails. 29 The Court held that the defendant’s conviction of
burglary in Missouri could not be counted as a violent felony,
because “most but not all the . . . Missouri statutes defining
second-degree burglary include all the elements of generic
burglary. . . . [I]t is not apparent to us from the sparse record
before us which of those statutes were the bases for Taylor’s prior
convictions.”30 Illustrative of the second requirement is
California’s burglary statute: the Supreme Court suggested in
dicta that because “California defines ‘burglary’ so broadly as to
25. IOWA CODE ANN. § 711.4 (West 2007).
26. United States v. Malloy, 614 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied sub nom. Kluge v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 3023 (2011). Note that
this decision was in fact addressing the definition of a violent felony under
the “career offender” portion of sentencing enhancements, though the
language of § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii) and § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines is substantially identical. Malloy, 614 F.3d at 856-57.
27. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
28. Id. at 589.
29. See id. at 602.
30. Id.
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include shoplifting and theft of goods from a ‘locked’ but
unoccupied automobile,” 31 a conviction of burglary in California
would not count as a violent felony under the ACCA. Whether one
is chagrined that a bevy of burglars escape sentencing
enhancement or delighted that shoplifters are off the hook is a
matter of penological taste. Either way, a more precise result
obtains from a judge’s discretion, rather than a statute’s blind
groping.
C. The Residual Clause
The Residual Clause theoretically tightens up the
underinclusiveness of the Force Clause. A crime qualifies as a
violent felony if it “otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.]” 32 Justice
Breyer explains that the Residual Clause of the ACCA is meant to
cover crimes which are “typically committed by those whom one
normally labels armed career criminals . . . [it targets behavior
that] show[s] an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind
of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the
trigger.” 33 Thus the fact that “battery” may not qualify as a violent
felony under the Force Clause does not necessarily foreclose the
possibility of it qualifying as such under the Residual Clause.34
The Residual Clause’s meaning is informed by the enumerated
felonies – in the text of the statute, the two are within the same
sentence.
Many an ink cartridge has coughed out its last word in a vain
effort to bring some semblance of regularity or principle to the
application of the Residual Clause. Four times since 2007 has the
Supreme Court addressed the question of “what is a violent
felony” 35 under this clause, and four interrelated tests—all of
31. Id. at 591 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2010) and United
States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 528-529, & n.2 (9th Cir. 1989)).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
33. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008).
34. In Johnson v. United States, discussed supra at page 6, the Supreme
Court neither considered the issue of whether Florida battery qualified under
the Residual Clause nor remanded for consideration of the issue because the
Government “disclaimed at sentencing any reliance upon [it.]” 130 S. Ct.
1265, 1274 (2010).
35. See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011); Chambers v.
United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009); Begay, 553 U.S. at 137; James v. United
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which remain good law—have emerged. 36 The fault may not lie
entirely with the drafters of the ACCA. It would have taken a
particularly perspicacious legislator to foresee the results of two
subsequent Supreme Court cases which would render Residual
Clause analysis, like Force Clause analysis, a categorical
inquiry.37 Concurring with the Court in an opinion which held
that failure-to-report was not a violent felony, Justice Alito wrote
that:
In 1986, when Congress enacted ACCA’s Residual
Clause . . . Congress may have assumed that [ACCA] . . .
would . . . require federal sentencing judges to determine
whether the particular facts of a particular case [that is,
the career criminal’s three prior convictions] triggered a
mandatory minimum sentence. But history took a
different track. [The] Court held that ACCA requires the
sentencing court to look only to the fact that the
defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within
certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the
prior convictions.38
The Supreme Court kicked off its most recent “ACCA-thon” in
2007 with James v. United States, which discussed whether a
conviction for attempted burglary in Florida constituted a violent
crime. 39 There the Court explained that a crime qualifies as a
violent felony if, in the typical case, the commission of the crime
creates a degree of risk “comparable to that posed by its closest
analog among the enumerated offenses.” 40 The Court found that
States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
36. See U.S. v. Oliveira, 798 F. Supp. 2d 319, 329 (D. Mass. 2011)
(“Importantly, Sykes did not overrule any of the previous [cases], and James,
Begay, and Chambers remain good law.”).
37. See James, 550 U.S. at 202 (“[W]e employ the categorical approach . .
. . Under this approach, we look only to the fact of conviction and the
statutory definition of the prior offense, and do not generally consider the
particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction. That is, we consider
whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its
inclusion within the residual provision, without inquiring into the specific
conduct of this particular offender.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990).
38. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 132 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added).
39. 550 U.S. at 192.
40. Id. at 203.
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the closest analog to attempted burglary was burglary, and
decided that attempted burglary was a violent felony because, like
the enumerated offenses, it “create[s] significant risks of bodily
injury to others, or of violent confrontation that could lead to such
injury.” 41
The 2007 James decision was closely followed by 2008’s
Begay, which analyzed whether the New Mexico offense of driving
under the influence (“DUI”) qualified as a violent felony under the
ACCA’s Residual Clause. 42 The Tenth Circuit answered in the
affirmative, because drunk driving has a similar degree of risk of
harm to the enumerated felonies.43 The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, distinguishing the DUI offense from the
enumerated felonies in that DUI offenders do not exhibit
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” 44 It may have
seemed, at the time, that this decision simply narrows James’
scope – not only must a crime create significant risks of bodily
injury or violent confrontation, the underlying conduct must also
be purposeful, violent, and aggressive. As the discussion of Sykes
v. United States below indicates, however, that interpretation
evidently “overreads” Begay. 45
In 2009, the Supreme Court was again called upon to apply
Residual Clause analysis in Chambers v. United States. 46 There
they held that a prior conviction of failing to report for courtordered detention did not qualify as a violent felony, though both
the District Court and the Seventh Circuit (in an opinion by Judge
Posner) 47 had decided the opposite. The Court noted that the
statute under which the defendant was convicted covered two
separate crimes – failure to report for detention, and escape from
a penal institution coupled with failure to report.48 Both the
41. Id. at 193.
42. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
43. Id. at 140.
44. Id. at 144 (internal quotations omitted).
45. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275 (2011) (“In
[petitioner’s] view this Court's decisions in Begay and Chambers require
ACCA predicates to be purposeful, violent, and aggressive in ways that
vehicle flight is not. Sykes, in taking this position, overreads the opinions of
this Court.”).
46. 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
47. United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2007).
48. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 122.
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District Court and the Seventh Circuit had decided as they did
base on the “escape” behavior encompassed by the statute.49 The
critical factor for the Supreme Court, however, was that the crime
did not “involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.” 50 This determination was in part
based upon a study which purported to demonstrate the
correlation vel non between convictions for escape and probability
that violence would accompany the crime. 51
The Supreme Court’s latest decision applying the ACCA’s
Residual Clause was Sykes v. United States, decided on June 9,
2011, which held that a violation of Indiana’s felony vehicle flight
statute constituted a violent felony. 52 After explaining that
felonious vehicle flight did not qualify as a violent felony either
under the Force Clause 53 or the enumerated felonies, Justice
Kennedy valiantly attempts to summarize the methodology
underlying Residual Clause analysis:
The sole decision of this Court concerning the reach of
ACCA’s residual clause in which risk was not the
dispositive factor is Begay, which held that driving under
the influence (DUI) is not an ACCA predicate[, because it
is] not purposeful, violent, and aggressive. . . . [DUI was]
analogiz[ed]
to
strict-liability,
negligence,
and
recklessness crimes. . . . The phrase ‘purposeful, violent,
and aggressive’ has no precise textual link to the residual
clause. . . . In many cases the purposeful, violent, and
aggressive inquiry will be redundant with the inquiry
into risk, for crimes that fall within the former
formulation and those that present serious potential risks
of physical injury to others tend to be one and the same.
As between the two inquiries, risk levels provide a
categorical and manageable standard that suffices to
49. Chambers, 473 F.3d at 727.
50. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128 (internal citations omitted).
51. Id. at 129 (“The [Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal Years
2006 and 2007] identifies every federal case in 2006 or 2007 in which a
federal sentencing court applied the Sentencing Guideline. . . and in which
sufficient detail was provided, say, in the presentence report, about the
circumstances of the crime to permit analysis.”).
52. 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
53. Id. at 2275.
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resolve the case before us. 54
Though the Court quoted James’ articulation that a crime is a
violent felony when the degree of risk posed by the crime is
“comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the
enumerated offenses,” 55 it did not identify a closest analog for the
crime of vehicle flight. Instead the Court decided that vehicle
flight was a violent felony because it is at least as risky as arson
or burglary. 56
The petitioner had partially relied upon Begay, suggesting
that it set a substantive requirement that ACCA predicate crimes
had to be purposeful, violent, and aggressive. 57 The Court
demurred and suggested that the key distinction was that DUI
was a type of strict liability or negligence crime, whereas the
statute in question had a mens rea requirement of purposeful or
knowing. 58 Again, the Court relied upon a statistical record – this
time suggesting that felonious vehicle flight was correlated
strongly with violence – in its determination that it was a violent
felony.
Justice Scalia dissented and opined that the ACCA should be
declared void for vagueness. 59 Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]he
residual-clause series will be endless, and we will be doing ad hoc
application of ACCA to the vast variety of state criminal offenses
until the cows come home.” 60 Justice Scalia found some merit in
the petitioner’s argument that felonious vehicle flight is neither
violent nor aggressive, and thus should not qualify as a violent
felony: “If the test excluded only [certain] unintentional crimes, it
would be recast as the ‘purposeful’ test, since the last two
adjectives (‘violent, and aggressive’) would do no work.”61 The
Supreme Court has not issued another decision clarifying the
application of the Residual Clause of ACCA, though not for lack of
petitioners.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2275.
56. Id. at 2273-75.
57. Id. at 2275.
58. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35–44–3–3(a) (West 2012) (requiring a mens
rea of “knowingly or intentionally”).
59. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2285 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Mayer held that
convictions obtained under Oregon’s first degree burglary statute
qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA. 62 The statute applied
to unlawful entries into “any booth, vehicle, boat, [and] aircraft,”63
rather than limiting burglary to entrances into buildings and
structures. Still, the Oregon burglary statute qualified because
the behavior prohibited leads to “a serious potential risk that [the
crime] will result in physical injury to another.” 64 Judge Kozinski
noted (while dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) that
“Oregon prosecutes as burglars people who pose no risk of injury
to anyone,” and cited an Oregon Supreme Court case affirming a
burglary conviction for “entering public telephone booths to steal
change from coin boxes.” 65 Though consistent with one line of
Supreme Court precedent on the ACCA’s Residual Clause – (Sykes
states that “[t]he sole decision of this Court concerning the reach
of ACCA’s residual clause in which risk was not the dispositive
factor is Begay” 66) the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion seems to run
contrary to the aforementioned dicta in Taylor. 67
In United States v. Johnson, 68 the Second Circuit held that
the Connecticut offense of “rioting at a correctional institution,”69
which punishes a defendant for, inter alia, “tak[ing] part in . . .
organized disobedience to the rules and regulations of [a
correctional] institution,” 70 qualifies as a violent felony under the
ACCA’s Residual Clause. Though organized disobedience could
encompass hunger strikes, the court wrote that even inciting or
participating in a hunger strike “involve[s] deliberate and
purposeful conduct.” 71
And, in the words of Justice Scalia, the Fourth Circuit has
recently suggested that “Oliver Twist was a violent felon,” 72
62. 560 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009).
63. Id. at 959.
64. Mayer, 560 F.3d at 962.
65. Id. at 952 (citing State v. Keys, 419 P.2d 943 (Or. 1966).
66. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275.
67. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).
68. 616 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Derby v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2858 (2011).
69. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a–179b(a) (West 2012).
70. Id.
71. Johnson, 616 F.3d at 90.
72. Derby v. United States, 131 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., dissenting
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because larceny from the person (defined as theft of money or
anything worth five dollars or more) 73 “does not necessarily
involve violence, but [does] require[ ] the offender to make
purposeful, aggressive moves to part the victim from his or her
property, creating a similar risk of violent confrontation.” 74
What do these cases have in common? Besides the fact that
certiorari was denied on all three,75 they demonstrate that the
application of the ACCA’s Residual Clause, even after four
Supreme Court opinions in four years, is hopelessly muddled and
may lead to paradoxical results which bestow the label “violent
felon” upon those who do not deserve it, or withhold it from those
who do.
PART III. A RATIONALIST ARGUMENT FOR INDIVIDUALIZING
SENTENCING.

In Part III.A I suggest that setting the appropriate sentence
for a crime is more accurate when more facts about the criminal
and the crime are known to the sentencing authority, regardless of
one’s philosophical justification for penal sanctions. Imagine that
for each crime – not each crime generically, like ‘second degree
murder’, but for each actual crime, like “Jerry stole $5 from Tom’s
hand while Tom was standing on the street corner, then ran off,” –
there is an ideal sentence.
The sentence must be justified by at least one76 of the
“legitimate” goals of penal sanctions recognized by the Supreme
Court: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.77
The ideal sentence, then, should deter Jerry (and the population)
from future mischief, and/or it should punish Jerry in proportion
to his injuries to society, and/or it should incapacitate him for a
time such that he will not be able to commit further crimes, and/or
from denial of certiorari).
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (West 2009).
74. United States v. Jarmon, 596 F.3d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 2010) cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 145 (2010).
75. Derby, 131 S. Ct. at 2858; Jarmon, 131 S. Ct. at 145; Mayer v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 158 (2009).
76. But see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one
penological theory.”).
77. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2010).
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it should place him in prison for long enough that he is
rehabilitated. These four goals may lead to contrary results. For
instance, this crime may excite little to no moral outrage in the
retributionist, while a utilitarian may suggest that “making an
example” out of Jerry will deter many petty thieves.
Whichever penological goal is preferred by the state, the
introduction of more facts should not hinder the ability to fashion
the most appropriate sentence. A retributionist is concerned with
righting the wrong done to a victim or society. Retribution finds
its justification in remedying past wrongs, rather than preventing
future wrongs. It follows, then, that a retributionist could better
fashion a sentence if she had a more precise understanding of the
past wrong. Who was the offender? Was there any element of the
offender’s crime that makes his transgression less culpable? A
woman who struck her husband may have been provoked in a way
that fell short of an affirmative legal defense, but that nonetheless
makes her less culpable than a woman who struck her husband
with no provocation. For the retributionist, a verdict of “guilty” or
“not guilty” and a set of nondescriptive legal elements do not tell
the whole story. So too for the incapacitationist, who imprisons
offenders so that they will not cause further harm to society.
Offenders whose crimes are legally identical may have committed
those crimes in such a way – or the offenders may have certain
characteristics – that make it more or less likely that they will
offend again in the future. And the rehabilitationist, whose goal is
to prevent habitual offending and “cure” the antisocial tendencies
of the criminal, is surely more likely to succeed in any such course
of treatment if more about the criminal and his crime are known
to the sentencing authority. For those concerned with individual
deterrence, 78 characteristics about the offender and his crime
would help fashion a sentence that would better deter an offender.
In each case, a sentencing authority has the opportunity to set a
sentence that better redresses the harm to society, better deters
the offender from future harm, better safeguards society from the
offender’s actions, or better plots the rehabilitative program.
General deterrence, however, is concerned with deterring
78. By “individual deterrence,” I mean “specific deterrence,” which is
aimed at discouraging the individual offender from committing future crimes,
rather than the general population from committing the crime.
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future offenders, rather than the specific offender before the
Court. The philosophy has been challenged by skeptics who claim
that the fundamental assumption of general deterrence – that the
public is aware of crimes and their respective sentences, and make
cost-benefit decisions on that basis – is flawed. 79 One concerned
with general, population-wide deterrence might instead set the
same punishment for all offenders who commit legally identical
crimes, on the theory that setting a uniform sentence for the same
“harm” – regardless of motive, background, and victim establishes a splendid deterrent. 80 But are general deterrers
better off with mandatory sentencing statutes? Not necessarily. In
order for general deterrence to be better served by mandatory
sentencing statutes, the given criminal offense must criminalize a
narrow range of conduct. If a given offense criminalizes a wide
range of conduct, then even general deterrers might see the need
for more particulars before sentencing is passed down.
Or, if mandatory sentencing statutes are abolished and the
unlikely worst case scenario results (judges give wildly disparate
sentences based on their own pet notion of penal sanctions and for
some reason appellate review of disparate sentences is ineffective),
then the goal of general deterrence may be met by making each
trip before a judge the equivalent of penal sanction Russian
roulette. Chamber 1, rehabilitationist, Chamber 2, specific
deterrer, Chamber 3, general deterrer, BLAM, serious jail time. If
a criminal is rational enough to be susceptible to general
deterrence, then they may be rational enough to avoid penal
sanction Russian Roulette.
PART IV. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

A. “Death is Different” as the Dividing Line
The police powers reserved to the state, 81 as well as an
79. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in
the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91
GEO. L.J. 949, 950-54 (2003) (discussing the legal knowledge hurdle and
collecting scholarship challenging the general deterrence rationale).
80. This is conceding that criminal statutes always describe the same
“harm” when they measure it in, e.g., dollars stolen.
81. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding
the authority of states to enforce compulsory vaccinations laws); Village of
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that zoning
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originalist reading of the Constitution, theoretically limit the
ability of the Court to tinker with state sentencing practices. But
in the last forty years, the Court has used the Eighth Amendment
to narrow the states’ freedom to punish as they see fit. In Woodson
v. North Carolina the Court confirmed with one hand that
“individualizing sentencing determinations . . . [is] simply
enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative,” but
with the other it “require[d] consideration of the character and
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.” 82
Woodson’s language was strong, but its limiting principle was
crisp: the death penalty. The Court has continuously recognized
that “death is different,” 83 and until recently it seemed that the
line would not be crossed, even though the Court made decisions
relative to the death penalty that, in principle, should be
applicable to non-capital cases. For instance, in the 1982 case
Enmund v. Florida, the Court held that Florida could not execute
a defendant convicted of murder on accessorial felony-murder
theories.84 Since the defendant did not kill, attempt to kill, or
intend to kill, it was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment
for a state to treat the defendant as it treated the robbers who
killed.85 This striking decision theoretically undermines the
vitality of the felony-murder doctrine: the Court stated that the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires
that states measure the culpability of a so-called felon-murderer
based on his individual conduct. 86 Indeed, if Enmund were not
limited to the death-penalty context, it would be a de facto
abolition of felony-murder. 87
ordinances are within a village’s police power).
82. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
83. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012); Woodson, 428 U.S.
at 305 (“The penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.”).
84. 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
85. Id. at 796, 798.
86. Id. at 798.
87. Though states could still label defendants like Enmund, as felonmurderers, they would be constitutionally required to sentence such
defendants based on their conduct. See, e.g., ARK.CODE ANN. § 5–10–
101(a)(1)(B) (2006) (requiring that a death occur in the course of a qualifying
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The “death is different” line was well-defended by
conservative members of the Court for a decade or so, but in the
early nineties fault lines began to show. In 1991, it was only for a
fractured 5-4 Court that Justice Scalia confirmed “[s]evere,
mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual
in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various
forms throughout our Nation’s history.” 88
B. Now Age is Different, too.
In the 2010 case Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court
crossed the “death is different” line.89 Justice Kennedy wrote for a
5-4 majority that juvenile offenders who do not commit homicide
may not receive a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.90
Though the Court has in a few instances overturned noncapital
sentences on a defendant-by-defendant basis using the so-called
narrow proportionality principle, 91 Graham was the first case in
which the Court established a broad, categorical rule against the
imposition of a punishment on a certain class of offender. 92 Chief
Justice Roberts opined that the majority established “a new
constitutional rule of dubious provenance.” 93 Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito dissented based on an originalist reading of the
Eighth Amendment. 94
Graham’s effect, admittedly, is narrow: it applied only to
juveniles who did not commit homicide, and only to sentences of
life imprisonment without parole.95 Only 123 prisoners nationwide
were so sentenced.96 But Graham is notable not for its effect, but
because it added another clause to the “death is different” line.
Graham left us with the much less pithy adage that death, and
life imprisonment without parole as applied to juveniles who do
not commit homicide, are different. But Graham did not apply
Woodson’s mandate that certain punishments require
felony).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991).
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
Id. at 2034.
See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227 (1983).
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
Id. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 2043-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2034.
Id. at 2024.
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individualized sentencing determinations.
Miller v. Alabama did. 97 Decided on June 25, 2012, Miller v.
Alabama struck yet another blow against mandatory sentencing
schemes. Miller was consolidated with Jackson v. Hobbs; both
cases involved 14-year-olds convicted of murder. 98 These are the
facts of Jackson, as set forth in the dissenting opinion of the
Arkansas Supreme Court:
Appellant Kuntrell Jackson was barely fourteen on the
night of the incident that led to his arrest. He was
walking with an older cousin and friend, Travis Booker
and Derrick Shields, through . . . [a] housing project . . .
when the boys began discussing the idea of robbing the
Movie Magic video store. On the way to Movie
Magic, Jackson became aware of the fact that Shields was
carrying a sawed-off .410 gauge shotgun in his coat
sleeve. When they arrived at the store, Shields and
Booker went in, but Jackson elected to remain outside by
the door. Shields pointed the shot gun at the video clerk,
Laurie Troup, and demanded that she “give up the
money.” Troup told Shields that she did not have any
money. A few moments later, Jackson went inside.
Shields demanded that Troup give up the money five or
six more times, and each time she refused. After Troup
mentioned something about calling the police, Shields
shot her in the face. The three boys then fled to Jackson’s
house without taking any money. 99
Jackson was tried as an adult and convicted of felonymurder. 100 A sentencing statute mandated a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole. 101 The statute precluded
consideration of Jackson’s youth, his precise role in the crime, and
other arguably mitigating circumstances. 102 His conviction was
affirmed on direct appeal in 2004, 103 but in 2005 the Supreme
97. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
98. Id. at 2463.
99. Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Ark. 2011) (Danielson, J.,
dissenting), rev’d sub. nom. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
100. Id. at 108 (Danielson, J., dissenting).
101. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(c)(1) (2006).
102. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
103. Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004).
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Court decided Roper v. Simmons, and in 2010, Graham v. Florida.
Roper v. Simmons categorically forbade the execution of any
offender for a crime committed before the offender’s eighteenth
birthday. 104 Both decisions exempted juveniles from certain types
of punishment because they were less culpable than adult
offenders. This categorical rule was justified by scientific research
indicating that, as compared to adults, juveniles exhibit “lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility”; they “are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure”; and their characters are ”not
as well formed.” 105
Holding that the logic of those cases was not “crime-specific,”
the Court in Miller fashioned a new rule protecting juveniles:
Mandatory life without parole for juveniles, even those who
commit homicide, is cruel and unusual.106 But Miller’s importance
to the fate of mandatory sentencing schemes had more to do with
a distinction drawn in the majority opinion between cases where
the Court “categorically bar[s] a penalty” and those where it
“mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process . . . before
imposing a particular penalty.”107
Categorical challenges to a given punishment require that the
defendant seeking relief provide evidence of national consensus
(legislative enactments and state practice) regarding the
sentencing practice. 108 Given that a majority of United States
jurisdictions made a life without parole sentence mandatory for
juveniles who committed homicide, 109 it seemed unlikely that any
national consensus against that sentencing practice could be
found. But Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, shouldered
aside the requirement for national consensus against a given
sentencing practice by recasting the petitioners’ challenge as one
to the process of meting out the penalty. 110 The decision cites
several cases for support that there is such a thing as a processbased challenge under the Eighth Amendment, 111 but each one of
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
Id. at 569-70.
132 S. Ct. at 2475.
Id. at 2471.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
Id.
Id.
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those cases was decided in the context of the death penalty.112
Miller casually extends this process-based challenge to youths,113
ensuring that “[t]here is no clear reason that [this] principle would
not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile
sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would
receive.” 114 Indeed, there is no clear reason that this principle
would not bar all mandatory sentences for any defendants who
exhibit some characteristic that uniformly mitigates their
culpability for a crime (e.g., mentally deficient defendants) or
those who did not pull the trigger in a felony-murder. By holding
that in process-based challenges, “we have not scrutinized or
relied in the same way on legislative enactments,” the Miller court
cast loose the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence from the
strictures of national consensus. 115
The decision to allow youths to bring process-based challenges
to their sentences is all the more striking because it was not
forced. The Court could have obtained the same result without
such a broad ruling: it could have extended Enmund’s special
treatment of felon-murderers from the death penalty context to
the juvenile-life-without-parole context, effectively holding that
Graham already covers juvenile felon-murderers. Indeed, this
holding was hinted at by Justice Breyer’s concurrence, which was
joined by Justice Sotomayor:
[I]f the State continues to seek a sentence of life without
the possibility of parole for Kuntrell Jackson, there will
have to be a determination whether Jackson “kill[ed] or
intend[ed] to kill” the robbery victim. In my view, without
such a finding, the Eighth Amendment as interpreted
112. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67 (1987) (a Nevada statute
that mandates death penalty for a prison inmate convicted of murder while
serving a life imprisonment is unconstitutional); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (remanding Oklahoma capital sentence for consideration
of mitigating circumstances); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (Ohio
statute does not allow the sentencer to consider mitigating factors).
113. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (“Our decision . . . mandates only that a
sentencer follow a certain process” and recognize “that youth matters for
purposes of meting out the law’s most serious punishments. When both of
those circumstances have obtained in the past, we have not scrutinized or
relied in the same way on legislative enactments.”).
114. Id. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2471.
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in Graham forbids sentencing Jackson to such a sentence,
regardless of whether its application is mandatory or
discretionary under state law. 116
Justice Breyer’s concurrence echoes the holding in Graham
that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without
parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit
homicide.” 117 What does it mean to commit homicide? The plain
meaning of “commit homicide” is likely the taking of one human
life by another. State classifications of “commit homicide” are not
so clear, and include felony-murders, which rely on the doctrine of
transferred intent to supply the requisite mens rea for the nontriggerman defendant. 118 But if Graham’s holding meant for the
plain meaning of homicide to control, then non-triggerman felonmurderers are already protected by Graham. This reading is
supported by the Court’s repeated reference to “juvenile
offender[s] who did not kill or intend to kill.” 119 Indeed, the
opposite holding – that state classifications of homicide control –
leads to a paradoxical result. In Arkansas, which has a felonymurder statute, Jackson’s conduct is deemed homicide and a life
without parole sentence is (under current law) constitutional, so
long as it is not imposed mandatorily. 120 In Kentucky, which does
not have a felony-murder statute, Jackson’s conduct would not be
a homicide offense. 121 In order to avoid the absurdity of Eighth
Amendment rights changing over a 100-mile stretch of I-55, the
plain meaning of homicide may control. 122
Death is different, and now children too. Punishment by
punishment, characteristic by characteristic, the Court is
116. Id. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring).
117. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
118. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(discussing the doctrine).
119. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
120. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (“[A] judge or jury must have the
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the
harshest possible penalty for juveniles. . . . [T]he mandatory sentencing
schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.”).
121. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (LexisNexis 2008).
122. Note, however, that Graham’s analysis of national consensus
regarding life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders arrived at
the 123 figure (for individuals serving life without parole sentences for nonhomicide crimes) by disincluding juvenile felon-murderers. 130 S. Ct. at 2035.
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establishing that while individualized sentencing was once no
more than enlightened policy, it is now a constitutional
imperative.
PART V. WHY MANDATORY SENTENCING SCHEMES WILL PERSIST.

Why will mandatory sentencing schemes persist? There are
both sound and unsound reasons. Beginning with the latter, it
appears that passing a mandatory sentencing scheme may be
politically expedient. Those who are most directly affected by a
penal sanction – i.e., criminals - are rarely politically powerful or
widely popular. This is especially so for so-called malum in se
crimes. If a politician proposes that every sexual offender receive a
mandatory two year enhancement on top of whatever already
exists, then the parties most interested in opposing the statute are
likely sexual offenders. Though some concerned citizens may point
out that, for instance, urinating in public may qualify one as a
“sex offender,” 123 public discourse may not reach a level of detail
such that the unintended consequences of the bill are discussed.
The Economist describes the mechanism by which sex offense laws
become harsher and harsher:
Sex-offender registries are popular. Rape and child
molestation are terrible crimes that can traumatise their
victims for life. All parents want to protect their children
from sexual predators, so politicians can nearly always
win votes by promising curbs on them. Those who object
can be called soft on child-molesters, a label most
politicians would rather avoid. This creates a ratchet
effect. Every lawmaker who wants to sound tough on sex
offenders has to propose a law tougher than the one
enacted by the last politician who wanted to sound tough
on sex offenders.124
Similarly, ACCA, for all its rounding errors, applies only to a
felon arrested with a firearm who has three arguably violent
123. See Sex Laws: Unjust and Ineffective, THE ECONOMIST, Aug 6, 2009,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/14164614?story_id=14164614
&source=hptextfeature; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West 1999).
124. Sex Laws: Unjust and Ineffective, THE ECONOMIST, Aug 6, 2009,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/14164614?story_id=14164614&
source=hptextfeature.
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felonies or serious drug offenses on his record. 125
Of course, not all of those who object to vesting sentencing
discretion in judges are demagogues. Concerns about irregular
sentencing (disparate sentences for similar crimes) as well as
outlier judges (i.e., judges who are far too lenient or far too harsh
with their sentences) are not irrational. However, these concerns
can be addressed by adopting a system similar to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are the product of the
United States Sentencing Commission, an independent agency of
the judicial branch created by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.126 The guidelines were originally conceived of as mandatory,
but in United States v. Booker 127 and United States v. Fanfan,
decided in January 2005, the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury. Since the guidelines obliged judges to make
factual findings that may increase a defendant’s sentence above
what would be permitted by a jury’s verdict, the Court determined
that
mandatory
application
of
the
guidelines
was
unconstitutional.128 The Court instead made them mandatorily
advisory, which means that judges must meditate on what
sentences would be under the guidelines, but are ultimately free
to depart from that figure. 129 The Supreme Court decided that
appellate review of district court sentences outside the advisory
guidelines would be conducted under the “unreasonableness”
standard. 130
In short, a mandatory sentencing scheme has been replaced
by an advisory scheme which compels the judge to take into
account what similar offenders have received as sentences for the
same crime in the past, yet allows for departure from the
guidelines if the judge deems the departure necessary. A sentence
outside of the Guidelines leads to a review for unreasonableness.
Have federal sentences become, as a result, too lenient?
Apparently not. A 2009 study demonstrated that above125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (2006).
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 261.
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Guidelines-range sentences are imposed at a rate double that of
the rate before Booker. 131 Even while the Guidelines were in
effect, the mandatory minimums did not have the effect that
“sentencing hawks” might have preferred: that is, reigning in
liberal judges who gave squishy, lenient sentences.132
Commentators instead note that the mandatory minimums
frustrate Republican political appointees (with political party
being an admittedly imperfect proxy for whether a judge is being
tough on crime) at the same level or a higher rate than the general
population of federal judges. 133
Have federal sentences become, as a result, too harsh? It is
theoretically possible that releasing federal judges from the
strictures of a mandatory sentencing scheme has permitted them
to hand down unforgiving sentences. But as one commentator
noted, it is unlikely: “Because legislatures tend to write high
statutory maxima into the criminal code—to take account of the
worst possible offense within each classification—the limitation
placed on judicial discretion by the [guideline] is seldom
confining.” 134 And in any case, the switch from a mandatory
sentencing scheme to an advisory scheme provides a corrective
mechanism defendants did not have before: appellate review of
their sentence. Prior to the Booker decision, appellate review of
sentences within the Guidelines was unavailable except in cases of
clear error or unconstitutionality. 135
131. Mark T. Doerr, Note, Not Guilty? Go to Jail. The Unconstitutionality
of Acquitted-Conduct Sentencing, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 236
(2009).
132. See, e.g., Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal
Judiciary? Why Congress' Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May
Undermine a Generation of Reform, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 7.
133. See, e.g., David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy:
Learning Lessons from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 76 n.256 (2008); David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the
War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion,
57 SMU L. REV. 211, 227-28 (2004); David M. Zlotnick, Shouting into the
Wind: District Court Judges and Federal Sentencing Policy, 9 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 645, 646 (2004); Todd David Peterson, Congressional
Investigations of Federal Judges, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13-20 (2004).
134. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals:
A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1445
n.19 (1997).
135. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the Guidelines
system, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all
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Still, any sentencing scheme which vests discretion in judges,
and subjects that discretion to review by judges, arguably
attenuates democratic influence on criminal sentencing. Judges,
even those that are elected, are theoretically less responsive to
public opinion than are legislators. But that is not to say that they
do not alter their sentences based on popular opinion. A recent
study of Washington State judges demonstrates that judges
appear to respond to political forces when issuing sentences:
“Whether judges respond to political pressure is an important
question occupying social scientists. We present evidence that
Washington State judges respond to such pressure by sentencing
serious crimes more severely.” 136
CONCLUSION

Given the potential for mandatory sentencing statutes to err
in fashioning the correct sentence for defendants, sentencing
discretion should be vested in judges. Without having to invest
scarce resources in separate sentencing hearings or further factfinding, vesting judges with sentencing discretion will result in a
more particularized determination of culpability. And perhaps,
with our “object all sublime, [we] shall achieve in time – to let the
punishment fit the crime.” 137
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